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Is the Notion of Divisible On-line/Off-line Signatures
Stronger than On-line/Off-line Signatures??
Man Ho Au, Willy Susilo and Yi Mu
Center for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Australia
{aau,wsusilo,ymu}@uow.edu.au

Abstract. On-line/Off-line signatures are useful in many applications where the signer has
a very limited response time once the message is presented. The idea is to perform the
signing process in two phases. The first phase is performed off-line before the message to be
signed is available and the second phase is performed on-line after the message to be signed
is provided. Recently, in CT-RSA 2009, Gao et al. made a very interesting observation that
most of the existing schemes possess the following structure. In the off-line phase, a partial
signature, called the off-line token is computed first. Upon completion of the on-line phase,
the off-line token constitutes part of the full signature. They considered the “off-line token
exposure problem” in which the off-line token is exposed in the off-line phase and introduced
a new model to capture this scenario. While intuitively the new requirement appears to be a
stronger notion, Gao et al. cannot discover a concrete attack on any of the existing schemes
under the new model. They regard clarifying the relationship between the models as an
open problem. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this open problem. We
construct an On-line/Off-line signature scheme, which is secure under the ordinary security
model whilst it is insecure in the new model. Specifically, we present a security proof under
the old model and a concrete attack of the scheme under the new model. This illustrates
that the new model is indeed stronger.

Keywords: on-line/off-line signatures, divisible on-line/off-line signatures, OS-EU-CMA, DOS-EUCMA
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Introduction

The notion on-line/off-line signatures (OS) was put forth by Even, Goldreich and Micali in
1990 [11]. Their main idea is to split the signature generation algorithm into two phases, namely,
off-line phase and on-line phase. To achieve efficient signing when a message is presented, they
utilized an off-line phase to handle the most costly computations. When a message is available, the
on-line phase can then be performed efficiently in order to generate the required signature. Some
of the signature schemes naturally fit into the framework of an on-line/off-line signature. The list
includes the schemes from Fiat-Shamir (or any signature scheme obtained from Σ-Protocol using
the Fiat-Shamir heuristics) [12], Schnorr [19], El-Gamal [13] and Boneh-Boyen [4].
Based on the work from Even, Goldreich and Micali, Shamir and Tauman [20] proposed an
improved online/offline signature scheme utilizing the hash-sign-switch paradigm . The online
signing phase of their scheme maintains the efficiency of Even et al., while key size and signature
size are largely reduced. Since then, many subsequent works have been done [15, 24, 16, 22, 23, 7,
9, 6].
1.1

Divisible of OS Schemes

Recently, in CT-RSA 2009, Gao et al. [26] made an interesting observation that most of the existing
on-line/off-line signature schemes [13, 22, 23, 7, 16, 9, 6] share the following divisibility structure. A
?
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partial signature, called an off-line token, is first computed in the off-line phase. The remaining
part of the signature is generated in the on-line phase when the message is known. OS schemes
satisfying this framework is said to be divisible.
Although the signature generation process is split into two stages, the transmission of the
signature is a one-time process. The complete signature is sent to the recipient at the end of
the on-line phase. Gao et al. studied an interesting problem: can the off-line token be transmitted
to the recipient prior to the on-line phase while maintaining the security of the OS scheme? The
significance of the question is that, the signer could send the signature in stages (during the off-line
phase), possibly when the channel is less busy. This can make better utilization of the bandwidth.
Another scenario is when the off-line tokens are unavoidably exposed to others (they referred this
case as the “token exposure problem”), in case of on-line/off-line threshold signatures [9, 6].
Gao et al. studied this off-line token exposure problem and proposed a new security model
to capture it. In this paper, we referred the new model as DOS-EU-CMA1 to distinguish it from
the traditional (or ‘regular’) model of OS-EU-CMA [11]. The standard notion of security for
a signature scheme is existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EU-CMA) [14].
Informally speaking, an attacker in this notion can request signatures on messages of its choice,
possibly adaptively, before outputting a forged signature on any message, provided that it has not
been given a signature on that message. Definition of DOS-EU-CMA and OS-EU-CMA shall be
reviewed in Section 2.5. Looking ahead, it is fair to say the notion OS-EU-CMA closely follows
the requirement of EU-CMA in which the OS is treated as an ordinary signature. Additionally, an
attacker in DOS-EU-CMA is allowed to separate his query of signature into two phases. Specifically,
the attacker is allowed to decide the querying message after receiving the off-line token.
Gao et al. presented a new scheme secure under their new model. They also analyzed several
existing schemes and observed that some of them are secure under the new model as well. Furthermore, the security of the remaining schemes under their examination is less clear. While they
are not able to derive security proof under the new model, they also cannot discover any concrete attack on these schemes. Hence, they left the problem of finding the potential gap between
the model of DOS-EU-CMA and OS-EU-CMA as an open problem. Specifically, they questioned
whether a scheme that is secure in OS-EU-CMA but it is not secure in DOS-EU-CMA can be
constructed at all, as an open problem.
1.2

Our Contribution

In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to the aforementioned open problem. Specifically,
we construct an on-line/off-line signature
scheme2 and prove its security under the model of OS-EU-CMA. Then, we present a concrete attack
on our scheme under the model of DOS-EU-CMA. Consequently, our construction illustrates the
gap between to two models. In summary, we provide an affirmative answer to the open problem
raised by Gao et al. in [26] and show that the new model is indeed stronger than the traditional
model. We would like to stress that the sole purpose of our construction is to demonstrate the
theoretical gap between the models. Thus, efficiency is not of our concern and indeed our scheme
is by no means practical compared with existing On-line/Off-line signatures.
1.3

Organization of The Paper

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review preliminaries including the
models of OS-EU-CMA and DOS-EU-CMA. Next, we present our OS scheme, its security analysis
under the model of OS-EU-CMA and an attack in the model of DOS-EU-CMA in Section 3.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4.
1
2

The abbreviation DOS refers to divisible on-line/off-line signatures.
We note that we are not concentrating on developing a practical or efficient scheme. Rather, we are
interested to show a scheme that is secure under OS-EU-CMA but it is not secure under DOS-EU-CMA,
and hence, it provides an answer to the open problem raised by Gao et al. [26].
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Secure under the traditional model? Secure under the new model [26]?
[12, 13, 4, 20, 22, 7]
X
?
[19, 9, 6, 26]
X
X
Our scheme
X
×
Table 1. Summary of the separation between the traditional model and the new model
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Preliminaries

2.1

Miscellaneous Notations

If S is a set, |S| represents its cardinality. If S is a non-empty set and a ∈R S, then a is an element
in S drawn uniformly at random from S. We denote by Z the set of integers {. . . , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
and by Zp we denote the set {0, . . . , p − 1}.
We say that a function negl(k) is a negligible function [1], if for all polynomials f (k), for all
sufficiently large k, negl(k) < 1/f (k).
2.2

Bilinear Map

A pairing is a bilinear mapping from a pair of group elements to a group element. Specifically, let
G1 , GT be cyclic groups of order p. Let g be a generator of G1 . A function ê : G1 × G1 → GT is
said to be a pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
– (Bilinearity.) ê(ux , v y ) = ê(u, v)xy for all u, v ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zp .
– (Non-Degeneracy.) ê(g, g) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the identity element of GT .
– (Efficient Computability.) ê(u, v) can be computed efficiently (that is, in polynomial time) for
all u, v ∈ G1 .
– (Unique Representation.) All elements in G1 and GT have unique binary representation.
2.3

Number-Theoretic Assumptions

Security of our proposed signature scheme is related to the hardness of the following problems.
The Discrete Logarithm Assumption The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [5] forms the
basis in the security of many cryptosystems.
Definition 1. The Discrete Logarithm Problem in G = hgi is defined as follows: On input a tuple
(g, Y ) ∈ G2 , output x such that Y = g x .
Shoup [21] derived a lower bound on any algorithms that solve DLP without exploiting any
special properties of the encoding of the group
√ element. Such algorithms are known as generic
algorithms. Specifically, the lower bound is Ω d , where d is the largest prime dividing the order
of the group. Indeed, such bound is met by the well-known Pollard’s rho algorithm [18] that works
in arbitrary groups. The discrete logarithm assumption stated that there is no PPT algorithm
solves DLP with non-negligible probability.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption If we can solve DLP in G, we can also solve the
computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) [10] problem although whether the converse is true or not is
still an open problem.
Definition 2. The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem in G = hgi such that |G| = p is defined
as follows: On input a tuple (g, g x , g y ) ∈ G3 , output g xy .
The CDH assumption states that no PPT solves CDHP with non-negligible probability.
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The Pairing Pre-Image Assumption
Definition 3. The Pairing Pre-Image Problem (PPIP) in G1 , GT such that G = hgi, |G1 | =
|GT | = p with pairing ê : G1 × G1 → GT is defined as follows: On input a tuple (g, Z) ∈ G1 × GT ,
output X ∈ G1 such that ê(X, g) = Z.
This problem is often implicitly assumed to be hard in many cryptosystems employing bilinear
maps. Indeed , it is straightforward to show PPIP is no harder than DLP in GT and no easier
than CDHP in G1 .
Specifically, suppose DLP in GT is easy. Given a PPIP instance (g, Z), compute x such that
Z = ê(g, g)x by solving DLP in GT of Z to base ê(g, g). Output g x as the solution to PPIP instance.
a b
On the other hand, assume PPIP is easy. Given a CDHP instance (g,
 g , g ) in G1 , compute X
a b
a b
such that ê(X, g) = ê(g , g ) by solving PPIP with input g, ê(g , g ) . Output X as the solution
of the CDHP instance.
Thus, we have the following relationship between CDHP in G1 , PPIP and DLP in GT .
CDHP in G1 <= PPIP <= DLP in GT
The PPI assumption states that no PPT solves PPIP with non-negligible probability.
2.4

On-line/Off-line Signatures

In the following, we review the syntax of an OS scheme.
Definition 4. An OS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, KeyGen, OffSign, OnSign and
Verify for generating keys, signing in the online and offline phase, and verifying signatures, respectively.
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ ). On input security parameter 1λ , the key generation algorithm outputs a
public/private key pair.
(Σ off , St) ← OffSign(sk). On input the secret key, the off-line signing algorithm outputs an offline token Σ off and some state information St.
(Σ on ) ← OnSign(sk, St, m). On input the secret key, a state information St and a message, the
on-line signing algorithm outputs an on-line token (Σ off , Σ on ). The signature of m is defined
as σ = (Σ off , Σ on )).
0/1 ← Verify(pk, m, σ). On input a public key, a message and a signature, the verification algorithms output 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
As mentioned by Gao et al., every OS scheme is trivially divisible under their definition by
setting Σ off as null 3 . Those schemes are called trivially divisible. Throughout this paper, we are
interested in OS scheme that is non-trivially divisible, that is, Σ off is not null .
2.5

Security Requirements

The standard notion of security for an OS scheme is existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (OS-EU-CMA) [14], which can be defined formally by the following game between a
challenger C and a PPT adversary A.
Definition 5 (Game OS-EU-CMA).
Setup: A challenger C runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public key pk and a private key sk. C
gives pk to A.
Queries: For the i-th query, A requests a signature on message mi . C responses by computing
(Σioff , St i ) ← OffSign(sk) followed by Σion ← OnSign(sk, St i , mi ). σi = (Σioff , Σion ) is returned
to A.
3

Or more generally, any dummy offline token.
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Output: A outputs a pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the game if m∗ ∈
/ {m1 , . . . , mq } and 1 ← Verify(pk, m∗ , σ ∗ ).
An OS scheme is OS-EU-CMA secure if no PPT adversary can win in Game OS-EU-CMA with
non-negligible probability.
In the following, we will review the new model proposed by Gao et al.. Looking ahead, the
major difference between the two notions is that attacker in the new model is allowed to adaptively
choose the query messages based on the off-line token. This is to capture the off-line token exposure
problem. Specifically, the following game between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A formally
defines the security requirement for a divisible on-line/off-line (DOS) scheme, as defined by Gao
et al.
Definition 6 (Game DOS-EU-CMA).
Setup: A challenger C runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public key pk and a private key sk. C
gives pk to A.
Off-Sign Queries: For the i-th query, A requests an off-line token. C responses by computing
(Σioff , St i ) ← OffSign(sk). Σioff is given to A while (Σioff , St i ) is stored in set U.
On-Sign Queries: A submits a message mi and an off-line token Σioff such that there exists
an entry (Σioff , St i ) ∈ U. C computes Σion ← OnSign(sk, St i , mi ). Σion is returned to A and
(Σioff , St i ) is removed from U.
Output: A outputs a pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the game if m∗ ∈
/ {m1 , . . . , mq } and 1 ← Verify(pk, m∗ , σ ∗ ).
An OS scheme is DOS-EU-CMA secure if no PPT adversary can win in Game DOS-EU-CMA
with non-negligible probability.
2.6

Relationship of OS-EU-CMA and DOS-EU-CMA

DOS-EU-CMA is at least no weaker than OS-EU-CMA as a security notion. However, it is unclear
whether there is a separation between the two. Gao et al. [26] analyzed a number of existing
schemes and proved that several of which are in fact DOS-EU-CMA, as shown in Table 2. Of the
remaining schemes that cannot be proven secure in the new model, they are not able to devise any
concrete attack. The following table is obtained from their results in [26]. The symbol “?” indicates
that it cannot be proven secure under the security notion while no explicit attack can be found
either. The word “Sig” in the assumption represents the security also depends on the security of
the underlying standard signature scheme. For the introduction to the q-SDH assumption and the
one-more discrete log assumption, we refer the readers to [3, 8] and [2], respectively.

OS-EU-CMA? DOS-EU-CMA?
Assumption
Fiat-Shamir [12]
X
?
El-Gamal [13]
X
?
DSS [17]
X
?
Boneh-Boyen [4]
X
?
Shamir-Tauman (generic) [20]
X
?
Xu et al. [22]
X
?
Chen et al. (generic) [7]
X
?
Schnorr-OS [19]
X
X
one-more-discrete log
Crutchfield et al. (generic) [9]
X
X
Sig + one-more-discrete log
Bresson et al. (generic) [6]
X
X
Sig + discrete log
Gao et al. [26]
X
X
q-SDH
Table 2. Summary of existing OS schemes
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3
3.1

Our Result
An On-line/Off-line Signature

In this section, we present our OS construction. We note that the goal of our construction is to
demonstrate the gap between the security notions of OS-EU-CMA and DOS-EU-CMA and thus
efficiency is not of prime concern.
KeyGen. Let ê : G1 × G1 → GT be a bilinear map. Note that |G1 | = |GT | = p for some
prime p. Let g be a generator of G1 . Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be a collision-resistant hash
function. Let X ∈R G1 and Z = ê(X, g). The secret key sk is (X) while the public key pk is
(ê, G1 , GT , p, g, Z, H). The message space M is G1 .
OffSign. Randomly generate R ∈ G1 , s ∈R Z∗p , output (Σ off , St) as (R, s).
OnSign. On input M ∈ G1 , (Σ off , St) = (R, s), compute ς = X(R/M )s . Further, generate
R
, g)r , c = H(T ||R||ς||M ) and z = r − cs. Output Σ on as (ς, c, z).
r ∈R Zp , compute T = ê( M
Verify. Given a public key (ê, G1 , GT , p, g, Z, H), a message M ∈ G1 , a signature σ =
R
(Σ off , Σ on ) = R, (ς, c, z) , verify that c = H (ê(ς, g)Z −1 )c ê( M
, g)z ||R||ς||M . If the equality
holds, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Correctness of the scheme is straightforward. Note that
c R
c R
R
ê(ς, g)Z −1 ê( , g)z = ê(X( )s , g)ê(X, g)−1 ê( , g)z
M
M
M
R s c R
−1
= ê(X, g)ê(X, g) ê(( ) , g) ê( , g)z
M
M
R
R
cs
z
= ê( , g) ê( , g)
M
M
R
r
= ê( , g)
M
=T

3.2

Security Analysis

We prove that our construction is a secure OS scheme by reduction. Suppose there is a forger A
that wins in Game OS-EU-CMA with probability , we construct a simulator S, having black-box
access to A, that solves the pairing pre-image problem in the random oracle model with success
probability q2 , assuming A makes qH queries to the hash oracle.
H

Proof. S is given a problem instance (ê, G1 , GT , p, g, Z) where g is a generator of G1 with prime
order p, its task is to compute X such that ê(X, g) = Z.
Setting up the public key. S sets the public key pk of the signer as (ê, G1 , GT , p, g, Z). In the
random oracle model, S also gets control over Hash function H. pk is given to the adversary A.

Simulating the Oracles. For the i-th query, A requests a signature on message mi ∈ G1 . S responses by randomly generates R, ς ∈R G1 , c, z ∈R Zp , computes T = (ê(ς, g)Z −1 )c ê( mRi , g)z and
backpatch the output of the random oracle H(T ||R||ς||mi ) as c. Returns σi = (R, ς, c, z) to A.
Hash Queries. S randomly chooses one of the qH hash queries with input T ∗ ||R∗ ||ς ∗ ||M ∗ and fork
the adversary. The two copies of the adversary receives the hash output as c∗ and c0 such that
c∗ 6= c0 respectively.

Is the notion of DOS stronger than OS?
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The Forgery and Reduction. Finally, the two copies of A output two forged signatures. With
probability at least q12 the two forged signatures are (R∗ , ς ∗ , c∗ , z ∗ ) on message M ∗ such that
H

∗
R∗
z∗
c∗ = H (ê(ς, g)Z −1 )c ê( M
|| R∗ || ς ∗ || M ∗ and (R∗ , ς ∗ , c0 , z 0 ) on the same message M ∗
∗ , g)
c0 R∗
c ∗ R ∗
z∗
z0
= ê(ς ∗ , g)Z −1 ê( M
such that ê(ς ∗ , g)Z −1 ê( M
∗ , g)
∗ , g) .
∗

z 0 −z ∗

R
c0 −c∗ . Indeed,
S computes X as ς( M
∗)

c 0 R ∗
∗
0
R∗
, g)z = ê(ς ∗ , g)Z −1 ê( ∗ , g)z
∗
M
M
c∗ −c0
0
∗
R∗
ê(ς ∗ , g)Z −1
= ê( ∗ , g)z −z
M
0
∗
0
∗
0
∗
R∗
Z c −c = ê( ∗ , g)z −z ê(ς ∗ , g)c −c
M
0
∗
R∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗
ê(X, g)c −c = ê(( ∗ )z −z ς c −c , g)
M

R∗ z0 −z∗
ê(X, g) = ê ( ∗ ) c0 −c∗ ς, g
M
∗
R∗ zc00 −z
X = ς( ∗ ) −c∗
M

ê(ς ∗ , g)Z −1

c ∗

ê(

Consequently, the success probability of S is at least
3.3


2 .
qH

t
u

An Attack of Our OS under Definition 6 (DOS-EU-CMA)

While our scheme is OS-EU-CMA secure, there is an attack under Definition 6 (DOS-EU-CMA),
i.e. the new model proposed by Gao et al. Specifically, the attacker first obtains an off-line token
R. Upon receiving R, the attacker chooses the message to query as M = R. ς in the corresponding
R r
signature R, (ς, c, z) will have the form of X since ς = X( M
) . Thus, the scheme is totally broken
with the secret key revealed when the attacker can choose the message after knowing the off-line
token.
The weakness of the scheme under Definition 6 is obvious: it is insecure when the off-line token
R is equal to the message M to be signed. This, however, will happen with negligible probability
when R is hidden from the attacker before message M to be signed is presented and thus the
scheme is still secure under Definition 5. This clearly illustrates that DOS-EU-CMA is a stronger
security notion compared with OS-EU-CMA.

4

Conclusion

We presented a new OS scheme and proved that it is secure under the traditional model of online/off-line signatures (OS-EU-CMA). Next, we presented a concrete attack of our scheme under
the newly-proposed model by Gao et al. [26], DOS-EU-CMA. This scheme exemplifies a case that
the model in [26] is indeed stronger than the traditional one. Hence, it provides an affirmative
answer to to the open problem in [26].
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